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ABSTRACT  
What is the modal significance of sortal concepts? It is generally accepted that sortal concepts 
provide persistence conditions with modal implications that are de re, and not merely de dicto. 
This appears to be assumed, as common ground, by theorists who disagree about whether 
things have their persistence conditions essentially, and by theorists who take opposing sides 
in the debate about whether coincident material objects are identical. I do not think that this 
important assumption has received the scrutiny that it deserves. In §§1–8 I examine the 
contrast between a ‘pure de dicto’ theory of persistence conditions and a variety of de re 
theories, ranging from the essentialist de re theory that holds that a thing’s persistence 
conditions are essential to it, to a theory according to which the relevant de re persistence 
conditions merely involve counterfactuals with no essentialist implications. I note (§4) that it 
is a striking feature of recent debates about material coincidence that both pluralists and 
monists (including contingent identity theorists such as David Lewis) appear to agree that a 
pure de dicto theory of persistence conditions is inadequate. I then consider (§9) whether there 
is any compelling reason to reject the pure de dicto theory in favour of a de re theory. I 
conclude that although there is a defensible argument against the pure de dicto theory, it has 
two interesting implications. First, the argument lends no support to an essentialist version of 
the de re theory. Secondly, it supports the rejection of the pure de dicto theory only by a 
theorist who is a pluralist about material coincidence. Hence it provides no justification for the 
rejection of the pure de dicto theory on the part of the contingent identity theorist.  
 
1. Introduction 
My topic is the modal significance of sortal concepts for questions of persistence through 
time. Sortal concepts provide identity conditions (or criteria of identity) for the things to 
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which they apply.
1
 For things that persist through time, including people, cats, trees, and 
tables, these identity conditions include ‘persistence conditions’: conditions that specify, 
for example, the kinds of change that they can and cannot undergo without ceasing to 
exist. Many traditional philosophical puzzles about identity concern persistence 
conditions. For example, do the persistence conditions for persons permit them to survive 
total and permanent amnesia, or a transfer from one body to another? Do the persistence 
conditions for ships favour the repaired ship, the reconstituted ship, or neither, in the 
Ship of Theseus puzzle? And so on. 
The notion of persistence conditions is evidently a modal notion.  What exactly 
its modal implications are, however, is debatable. 
One view is that when we say that a thing can or cannot survive certain changes 
in virtue of its persistence conditions, we are saying something about how it is 
essentially, because things have their persistence conditions essentially. This view –
whose most prominent advocate is David Wiggins – goes naturally with a theory that has 
been called ‘sortal essentialism’.2 This is the view that some sortal concepts represent 
essential properties of the things to which they apply: that some sortals are ‘essential 
sortals’.3 However, a commitment to the claim that persistence conditions are essential to 
                                                 
1
 I shall not try to define the notion of a sortal concept, although I shall assume that the principal 
distinguishing feature of sortal concepts is their role in individuation. Modern applications of the 
notion appear to have, as their starting point, Strawson’s distinction between ‘sortal universals’ 
and ‘characterizing universals’ (1959, esp. p. 168). The most detailed discussions of the notion 
are probably those given by Wiggins (1967, 1980, 2001). For a general survey, see Grandy 2008. 
 
2
 For Wiggins’s defence of the view that a thing’s persistence conditions are essential to it, see 
his 1980, Ch. 4, and 2001, Ch. 4. (Wiggins himself does not use the term ‘sortal essentialism’, 
however.) I say that this theory ‘goes naturally with’ sortal essentialism, rather than that it 
implies it, because one could, in principle, deny Wiggins’s thesis that any two sortals that supply 
the same persistence conditions are restrictions of some further sortal concept. See Ayers 1974, 
and Mackie 2006, Ch. 8, §7. In the rest of this paper I usually ignore this complication. 
 
3
 I use ‘sortal’ as an abbreviation for ‘sortal concept’. I shall take it that to any sortal concept 
there corresponds a sortal property, and that where F is an essential sortal, being F is an essential 
property of the things that are F.  
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their possessors is not the only conception of the modal significance of persistence 
conditions, and it is part of the purpose of this paper to explore the alternatives.
 
 Even for 
those who are convinced of the truth of sortal essentialism, this investigation should be of 
interest. From their perspective, it must still be relevant to consider the consequences of 
adopting a non-essentialist theory of the modal significance of the persistence conditions 
that sortal concepts provide.
4
 
 
 
2. Substance sortals, necessarily permanent properties, and persistence conditions 
If we ask about the modal significance of sortal concepts, our focus must be on what are 
called ‘substance sortals’: sortals that must apply to an object throughout its existence if 
they apply to it at all. This category may include, perhaps, the sortals human being and 
cat, for example, as opposed to the sortals boy and kitten.
5
 
 The notion of a substance sortal is a modal notion. A substance sortal must apply 
to an object throughout its existence if it applies to the object at all, in the following 
sense: if F is a substance sortal property, then there is no possible world in which there is 
anything that is an F at some time in its existence in that world that is not an F at all 
times in its existence in that world. If F is a substance sortal property, nothing can 
change over time from being an F to not being an F, or vice versa (without going out of 
                                                 
4
 Sortal essentialism, together with the associated thesis that things have their persistence 
conditions essentially, is subjected to a sceptical attack in Mackie 1994 and 2006. However, 
neither of these works discusses the issues that are the subject of this paper. 
 
5
 If the provision of criteria of identity is the mark of a sortal, then boy and kitten may count as 
sortals, although they obviously fail the test for being substance sortals. But it is also plausible to 
say (as does David Wiggins (1980, 2001)) that these and other so-called ‘phased sortals’ are 
restrictions of substance sortals: for example, that to be a kitten is to be an immature cat, where 
cat is a substance sortal.  
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existence). Properties that satisfy this condition have been called ‘necessarily permanent’ 
properties (Parsons 2005: 9).  
 There are three things that I want to emphasize about this. 
 
(1) First, the fact that a substance sortal property is necessarily permanent does not entail 
that it is an essential property, in the standard, modern sense of the term, according to 
which to say that being F is an essential property of x is to imply that x could not have 
existed without being F. For example, the claim that human being is a substance sortal 
that applies to Aristotle does not, by itself, imply that Aristotle could not have existed 
without being human. All that it implies is that if Aristotle had existed without being 
human, he could have done so only by being non-human throughout his existence. 
Moreover, this point (that there is a logical gap between being a substance sortal property 
and being an essential property) is not particularly contentious, and is accepted by several 
advocates of sortal essentialism (including Wiggins).
6
 
 
(2) Secondly (and this is connected with the first point), we can capture the notion of a 
necessarily permanent property in principles that involve only modality de dicto, rather 
than modality de re. For to say that being (an) F is a necessarily permanent property is 
merely to say that it satisfies the principle (NP): 
               
                                                 
6
 See, for example, Wiggins 1980: 215–16, longer note 4.24; Brody 1980: 116–23: both theorists 
are sortal essentialists. Others who have noted the logical gap include Kripke (1980, note 57), 
Kirwan (1970: 50), and Parsons (2005: 9). See also Mackie 2006 and 1994. The gap has to do 
with the distinction between ‘x could not have become non-F’ and ‘x could not have been non-F’. 
In addition to recognizing the logical gap, Wiggins presents a version of sortal essentialism that 
implies that there may be substance sortals that are not essential sortals because they are not what 
he calls ‘ultimate sortals’. See Wiggins 1980: 64–5, and, for discussion, Mackie 2006: 133ff., and 
Mackie 1994: 323. 
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(NP) Necessarily (for all x, if x is (an) F at any time in its existence, then x is (an) F at 
all times in its existence). 
 
By standard criteria, (NP) counts as a de dicto modal principle, not a de re one. (NP) is 
silent on the question whether a thing that is (an) F in one possible world is also (an) F in 
other possible worlds. 
 
(3) The third point is that the modal significance of substance sortal properties is not 
exhausted by their being necessarily permanent properties. Something may satisfy the 
criteria for being a necessarily permanent property, and yet fail thereby to provide 
persistence conditions in the way that substance sortal properties do. 
 Consider the property of being a permanent bachelor (defined as being a male 
human being who in fact never marries), and the property of originating in Finland. If 
these are genuine properties, evidently they are ‘necessarily permanent’. But neither of 
these properties provides, in virtue of its being necessarily permanent, persistence 
conditions for the things to which it applies. The property of originating in Finland, for 
example, tells you almost nothing about the persistence conditions of a thing that has it. 
And in so far as to be told that something is a permanent bachelor is to be informed about 
its persistence conditions (that they are those of a human being), the permanent-bachelor 
property indicates the relevant persistence conditions in exactly the same, purely 
derivative, way as does the simple property of being a bachelor, a property that does not 
have the characteristic of necessary permanence. 
 Why is it that these necessarily permanent properties – being a permanent 
bachelor and originating in Finland – fail to provide persistence conditions in the way 
that substance sortals do? It seems clear that part of the answer is that they fail to tell us 
(at least non-derivatively) about the changes that will bring to an end the existence of a 
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thing that is a permanent bachelor or a thing that originates in Finland – what changes 
will result in that thing’s ceasing to exist.7 The moral appears to be that, in providing 
persistence conditions, substance sortals provide, inter alia, what we may call ‘passing-
away conditions’, specifying changes that the things to which they apply cannot survive, 
not in the trivial (or Pickwickian) sense in which permanent bachelors ‘cannot survive’ 
marriage, but, rather, conditions that bring to an end the things’ existence.  
 
 
3. The de dicto modal significance of passing-away conditions and preservation 
conditions 
Let us suppose, then, that, in addition to being necessarily permanent, substance sortals 
provide passing-away conditions. On the face of it, it seems that this extra characteristic 
can also be accommodated without introducing any de re modal principles. 
 Suppose, for example, that statue is a substance sortal.
8
 Then we have the 
principle (S)(1), which says that being a statue is a necessarily permanent property: 
 
(S)(1) Necessarily (for all x, if x is a statue at any time in its existence, then x is a 
statue at all times in its existence). 
 
It is plausible to say that the concept statue also supplies ‘passing-away conditions’ that 
include the principle (S)(2): 
                                                 
7
 Although it is true that, in a sense, permanent bachelors cannot survive marriage (you will find 
no possible world in which there are permanent bachelors who marry and exist thereafter), this 
fact implies nothing about what it takes for a permanent bachelor to cease to exist. No permanent 
bachelor goes out of existence when a man marries. Rather, when a man marries, that just shows 
that he never was a permanent bachelor.  
 
8
 This may not be universally accepted. However, I need an example for my discussion. I think 
that the main arguments of this paper can be detached from my use of this particular example. 
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(S)(2) Necessarily (for all x, if x is a statue, then, if the matter that constitutes x at t is 
radically reshaped at t, x then ceases to exist).
9
 
 
(S)(2) reflects the idea that a statue cannot survive radical reshaping: that a statue of a 
lion, for example, would be destroyed if it were compressed into an amorphous lump, or 
reshaped in the form of an elephant.  
 (S)(2) is a modal principle about statues, one that, I suggest, distinguishes the 
property of being a statue from necessarily permanent properties like being a permanent 
bachelor or originating in Finland.
10
 However, like (S)(1), (S)(2) is still a de dicto modal 
principle. Like (S)(1), (S)(2) is silent on the question whether a thing that is a statue in 
one possible world is a statue in other possible worlds. Hence (S)(2) appears to have no 
implications for the modal properties of any thing that is a statue.
11
 For the notion of a 
modal property involves modality de re, and not merely modality de dicto. 
                                                 
9
 There is, perhaps, a problem about when, exactly, a statue whose matter is radically reshaped at 
t ceases to exist. Does it go out of existence precisely at t, or only immediately after t? Both 
suggestions seem problematic. I shall simply assume that there is a solution to this problem. 
 
10
 For example, although we have: 
 
(B)(1) Necessarily (for all x, if x is a permanent bachelor at any time in its existence, then x is 
a permanent bachelor at all times in its existence), 
 
which says, in effect (and truly), that the property of being a permanent bachelor is necessarily 
permanent, we do not have: 
 
(B)(2) Necessarily (for all x, if x is a permanent bachelor, then, if the man who ‘constitutes’ x 
at t marries at t, x then ceases to exist).  
 
Or, at least, if (B)(2) is true, it is true only vacuously, since there is no possible world in which a 
man satisfies the condition of ‘constituting’ a permanent bachelor (in that world) and also marries 
(in that world). By contrast, there are possible worlds in which the matter that constitutes 
something that is (in those worlds) a statue is radically reshaped, so (S)(2) is not vacuously true. 
(S)(2) tells us that, in such worlds, the statue ceases to exist when the reshaping occurs, and 
hence tells us something about the ‘passing-away conditions’ for statues. 
 
11
  Except in the following completely uninteresting sense. For those who accept quantification 
into modal contexts, the de dicto principle (S)(1) has the de re modal implication that everything 
                                              
 
8
 Having recognized passing-away conditions, we can also recognize ‘preservation 
conditions’ associated with substance sortals. For example, we may plausibly claim that 
the following principle (S)(3) is a preservation condition associated with the sortal statue 
– a principle that says, in effect, that it is part of the persistence conditions for statues that 
they survive ‘patching’: 
 
(S)(3) Necessarily (for all x, if x is a statue, then, if a relatively small portion of the 
matter that constitutes x at t is removed and immediately replaced by exactly similar 
matter, and no other change is made to x, x survives). 
 
Like (S)(1) and (S)(2), (S)(3) is a de dicto modal principle, which has, by itself, no 
significant de re modal implications.
12
 Like (S)(1) and (S)(2), (S)(3) is silent on the 
question whether a thing that is a statue in one possible world is a statue in other possible 
worlds.  
I take it that it is relatively uncontroversial that the persistence conditions 
associated with a substance sortal include de dicto passing-away conditions such as 
(S)(2), and de dicto preservation conditions such as (S)(3), in addition to de dicto 
‘necessary permanence’ conditions such as (S)(1). However, these results raise a 
potentially more controversial issue: whether there is any need at all to appeal to de re 
                                                                                                                                                 
(including anything that is a statue) has the following property: in any possible world in which it 
is a statue, it is a statue throughout its existence. The de dicto principle (S)(2) has a similar de re 
modal implication. I shall ignore, as irrelevant, this (trivial) sense in which such de dicto 
principles may be said to have de re (and, indeed, essentialist) modal implications. The extra de 
re commitments are trivial in the sense that they involve ‘essentialist’ commitments that are no 
more substantial than a commitment to the view that everything has the essential property of 
being coloured-if-purple, or to the view that everything has the essential property of being not a 
four-sided triangle, de re commitments that are merely parasitic on uncontroversial de dicto 
principles. See also §9.1 below. 
 
12
 For the reason for the qualification ‘significant’, see the previous note. 
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modality, in addition to de dicto modality, in order to capture the modal significance of 
the persistence conditions associated with substance sortals. To this issue I now turn. 
 
 
4. Beyond the de dicto? 
If it were the case that no such additional appeal to the de re is needed, this would be a 
remarkable result. For it is standardly assumed that the fact that a thing has certain 
persistence conditions does have significant de re modal implications. Take the puzzle, 
made prominent by Allan Gibbard (1975), concerning whether a statue and a piece of 
clay that coincide throughout their existence are identical. In discussions of this puzzle, it 
is typically taken for granted that the statue and the piece of clay, although they actually 
coincide throughout their existence, at least appear to differ in their persistence 
conditions, and that, as a result, they appear to differ in their modal properties; hence that 
there is at least a prima facie objection, based on Leibniz’s Law, to the identification of 
the statue with the piece of clay. To take another example, when David Lewis (1971) 
argues that he may be identical with his body, he takes himself to be required to 
overcome the objection that he (that is, the person who is David Lewis) and his body 
cannot be identical, even if they coincide throughout their existence, because they differ 
in their modal properties. Why? Because, apparently, a person can switch bodies 
although a body cannot: an apparent difference in modal properties that seems to depend 
on a difference in the persistence conditions associated with the concepts person and 
body.  
 Now, it is well known that some theorists (including Gibbard and Lewis) hold 
that, in coincidence cases such as these, the apparent modal difference does not 
correspond to a genuine difference in the properties of the ‘coincident’ entities. But it is 
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remarkable that even those who deny that there is a genuine difference in the modal 
properties of the entities in such cases typically accept that there is a genuine difference 
in the truth values of certain de re modal statements. For example, such theorists are 
likely to accept that, in a case where a statue and a piece of clay actually coincide 
throughout their existence (a ‘permanent coincidence’ case), the de re statement 
 
(1M) The statue could have been subjected to a radical reshaping of its matter without 
being destroyed 
 
is false, although the de re statement 
 
(2M) The piece of clay could have been subjected to a radical reshaping of its matter 
without being destroyed  
 
is true, even if they go on to claim that (2M) does not attribute to the piece of clay the 
same property that (1M) attributes to the statue – and even if they use this to defend the 
thesis that, in a permanent coincidence case, the statue and the piece of clay are 
identical.
13
 
 Thus the participants in the debate about whether permanently coincident entities 
are identical, in spite of their disagreements, seem to share a common assumption: that 
the persistence conditions associated with sortals such as statue and piece of clay have 
significant modal implications that are not merely de dicto, but also de re – since, at the 
                                                 
13
 e.g., Gibbard (1975), Lewis (1971; 1986, Ch. 4), Noonan (1991, 1993). All these theorists find 
it intolerable to suppose that a statue and a piece of clay could completely coincide throughout 
their existence, sharing all their matter and microphysical parts, and yet fail to be identical. 
However, they hold that it is possible for a numerically distinct statue and piece of clay to 
coincide merely temporarily. Hence they commit themselves to the view that the identity between 
a statue and a piece of clay that coincide permanently is, in a sense, ‘contingent identity’.  
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very least, they have a bearing on the truth values of certain de re modal statements, such 
as (1M) and (2M).
14
  
  
 
5. Persistence conditions and essential properties 
If the de re statement (1M) is false, then it seems that the de re statement (3M) is true: 
 
(3M) The statue could not have been subjected to a radical reshaping of its matter 
without being destroyed. 
 
But what exactly does (3M) add to the de dicto claim  
 
(S)(2) Necessarily (for all x, if x is a statue, then, if the matter that constitutes x at t is 
radically reshaped at t, x then ceases to exist), 
 
which expresses one of the passing-away conditions for statues (§3)? 
 A natural interpretation of (3M) is that it implies: 
 
(3M*) The statue is such that, in all possible worlds in which it is subjected to a 
radical reshaping of its matter, it is destroyed. 
 
Given that there surely are possible worlds in which the statue (call it ‘Statue’) is 
subjected to a radical reshaping, if (3M*) is true, it is not merely vacuously true. As a 
consequence, (3M*) appears to require, for its truth, the further de re claim that Statue is 
                                                 
14
 Of course, I am here assuming that both statue and piece of clay are genuine substance sortals, 
associated with persistence conditions for the things to which they apply. Discussion of this 
assumption is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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essentially a statue – or, at least, that it is essentially ‘statue-like’, in the following sense: 
in all possible worlds in which it exists, it has persistence conditions that include the 
relevant passing-away condition for statues (i.e., that represented by the principle (S)(2)). 
This would mean, for example, that Statue could not have been a piece of clay instead of 
a statue, since it would not then have had the relevant passing-away condition for 
statues.
15
 
 
 
6. Persistence conditions, essentialism, and Abelardian counterpart theory 
One might wonder what becomes of the argument presented in the previous section if 
(3M) is given an interpretation in terms of an ‘inconstant’ or (to use the terminology 
introduced by Harold Noonan (1991, 1993)) ‘Abelardian’ version of counterpart theory, 
such as the one advocated by David Lewis (1971; 1986, Ch. 4).
16
  Is there an 
‘essentialist’ interpretation of (3M), corresponding to (3M*), that it would be appropriate 
                                                 
15
 I admit that there is a gap in the argument for the conclusion that (3M*) implies that statues are 
essentially statues (or at least essentially ‘statue-like’). Suppose that there are possible worlds in 
which Statue is not statue-like, but in none of these worlds is Statue subjected to a radical 
reshaping of its matter. Then these worlds do not constitute counterexamples to (3M*), although 
they are counterexamples to the claim that Statue is essentially statue-like. We might even 
suppose that in some such worlds Statue is an amorphous piece of clay rather than a statue, 
although obviously other ways in which Statue could have failed to be statue-like might be 
suggested. However, it seems implausible to suppose that, if there are worlds in which Statue is 
not statue-like, they are restricted to worlds in which its matter is not radically reshaped, since the 
restriction would apparently be completely arbitrary. So, while recognizing this limitation to the 
argument, I think it can be ignored. 
 
16
  According to Noonan’s terminology, an Abelardian predicate is a predicate that can stand for 
different properties depending on the subject term to which it is attached (1991, 1993). Lewis’s 
(1971) version of counterpart theory evidently involves a treatment of modal predicates that is 
Abelardian in Noonan’s sense, since it implies that the modal predicate ‘could have been 
subjected to a radical reshaping of its matter without being destroyed’ can stand for a different 
property when attached to the expression ‘the statue’ from the property that it stands for when 
attached to the expression ‘the piece of clay’, and thus that a difference in truth value between 
(1M) and (2M) does not entail that the statue and the piece of clay in a coincidence case are 
numerically distinct. For an ‘Abelardian’ treatment of modal predicates that does not make use of 
counterpart theory, see Gibbard 1975. For simplicity, I confine my discussion to the counterpart-
theoretic version. 
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for the Abelardian theorist to adopt, and which yields the conclusion that Statue is 
essentially a statue (or at least essentially statue-like)? I believe that there is. Suppose that 
(3M*) is interpreted, in accordance with Lewis’s ‘inconstant’ or ‘Abelardian’ (as I shall 
from now on call it) version of counterpart theory, as: 
 
(3M*CP) The statue is such that none of its statue-counterparts (in any possible world) 
is subjected to a radical reshaping of its matter without being destroyed. 
 
(3M*CP) is compatible with its being the case that, in addition to its statue-counterparts 
(its counterparts under the statue counterpart relation), the statue (Statue) has 
counterparts under some other counterpart relation (perhaps the persisting-thing-
composed-of-clay counterpart relation) that are subjected to a radical reshaping of their 
matter without being destroyed – because they are pieces of clay and not statues, for 
example. Nevertheless, that has no tendency to undermine the claim that the truth of 
(3M*CP) requires that all of Statue’s statue-counterparts are statues (or, at least, are 
sufficiently like statues to have the relevant persistence conditions for statues
17
). For 
suppose, for the sake of a reductio, that Statue’s statue-counterparts include things that 
are pieces of clay and not statues, and hence have the persistence conditions for pieces of 
clay and not those for statues. Consider a possible world w such that (a) in w, a statue-
counterpart of Statue is subjected to a radical reshaping of its matter in which all that 
matter is preserved in one coherent mass, but (b) this statue-counterpart of Statue in w is 
                                                 
17
 I do not see how something could be sufficiently like a statue in this respect, and yet fail to be a 
statue. However, in some other cases, the idea that something that is an F, where F is a sortal, 
might have F-counterparts that are not themselves Fs, but are ‘relevantly similar’ to Fs (by having 
the persistence conditions of Fs) has some plausibility. As David Lewis (1971) suggests, perhaps 
the personal counterparts of a person might include things such as robots, which are not persons 
but ‘very like’ persons. The sortal piece of clay (assuming that this is a sortal) may provide 
another example, as indicated in the text below, since the piece-of-clay counterparts of a piece of 
clay might include some things that are (e.g.) pieces of wax rather than pieces of clay, but have 
the same persistence conditions as pieces of clay. 
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a piece of clay and not a statue. Evidently, if there is such a possible world, it is one in 
which a statue-counterpart of Statue survives the radical reshaping of its matter, thus 
contradicting (3M*CP). 
 The argument so far given is an argument for the conclusion that (if we ignore the 
possibility that a statue-counterpart of Statue might be relevantly statue-like without 
being a statue
18
), the Abelardian version of (3M*) – that is, (3M*CP) – implies that all the 
statue-counterparts of Statue are statues.
19
 But should we take this to imply a 
commitment to the conclusion that Statue is essentially a statue, given that (according to 
the Abelardian theory) Statue may also have counterparts (under some different 
counterpart relation) that are not statues? I think it is reasonable to do so. For a plausible 
translation into the Abelardian version of counterpart theory of:  
 
(5M) The statue (Statue) is essentially a statue 
 
is 
 
(5MCP) The statue (Statue) is such that all of its statue-counterparts are statues. 
 
What this version of counterpart theory implies, of course, is that (5M) is compatible 
with: 
 
(6M) The piece of clay (Piece) is not essentially a statue, 
 
                                                 
18
 See the previous note. 
 
19
 This argument is, of course, subject to the qualification mentioned in note 15 above, applied to 
the Abelardian counterpart-theoretic account of modal predicates. 
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interpreted as: 
 
(6MCP) The piece of clay (Piece) has piece-of-clay-counterparts that are not statues, 
 
even if Statue is identical with Piece. But all that this shows is that, on an Abelardian 
version of counterpart theory, the context ‘x is essentially (an) F’, like other de re modal 
contexts, is not referentially transparent with respect to its subject place (see Lewis 
1971). And I see no reason why the Abelardian theorist should treat ‘x is essentially (an) 
F’ as unlike other de re modal contexts in being referentially transparent – as requiring 
that all of x’s counterparts, under every counterpart relation according to which x has 
counterparts, are F(s).
20
 
 
 
7. The essentialist de re theory and the pure de dicto theory 
I have argued that to hold that the persistence conditions for statues support de re modal 
statements like (3M), in addition to de dicto principles such as (S)(2), is naturally 
interpreted as involving an essentialist commitment. Similarly, if one holds that the 
persistence conditions for pieces of clay support a de re modal statement like (4M): 
 
                                                 
20
 Admittedly, David Lewis has said that the introduction of what I call the ‘Abelardian’ version 
of counterpart theory means that we should recognize a distinction between the ‘real essence’ of 
a thing, in the sense of the properties common to all its counterparts, and the ‘intermediate 
essence’ of a thing under a certain description ‘F’, which consists of the properties common to all 
its F-counterparts (Lewis 1971, p. 54 in the version reprinted in Lewis 1983). However, if we ask 
which of these two notions of essence it is natural for the Abelardian counterpart theorist to 
employ when translating essentialist statements such as (5M) and (6M), I think that the latter is at 
least as natural as the former. 
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(4M) The piece of clay could not have been subjected to a radical reshaping of its 
matter and thereby been destroyed, if the reshaping is one that preserves all its matter 
in one coherent mass, 
 
this is naturally interpreted as involving an essentialist commitment. A natural 
interpretation of (4M) is: 
 
(4M*) The piece of clay is such that, in all possible worlds in which it is subjected to a 
radical reshaping in which all its matter in preserved in one coherent mass, it survives. 
 
And (4M*) appears to require, for its truth, that the piece of clay is essentially a piece of 
clay – or, at least, that it has essentially the persistence conditions for pieces of clay – 
which might, perhaps, be the same as the persistence conditions for pieces of matter of 
kinds other than clay (pieces of plasticene, wax, bronze, etc.).
21 
 The relevant persistence 
conditions might include the following de dicto ‘preservation condition’: 
 
(P)(2) Necessarily (for all x, if x is a piece of clay, then, if the matter that constitutes x 
at t is radically reshaped at t but preserved in one coherent mass, x survives). 
 
 Taking stock, we can now recognize two competing theories of the modal 
implications of the persistence conditions that are associated with substance sortals.
22
 
                                                 
21
 Strictly speaking, there is a gap in this argument for the conclusion that (4M*) has this 
essentialist implication, for the same reasons, mutatis mutandis, as I noted, in connection with 
(3M*), in note 15 above. That is, (4M*) could be true, compatibly with there being possible 
worlds in which the piece of clay lacks the persistence conditions of a piece of clay, as long as 
any such possible world is also one in which it is not subjected to a radical reshaping of its matter 
in which all its matter is preserved in one coherent mass. However, as in the case of the 
implications of (3M*) discussed above, such a restriction would appear to be entirely arbitrary, 
and so I think this complication can safely be ignored. 
 
22
 As I have already noted, I assume for the purposes of this discussion that both statue and piece 
of clay are substance sortals. 
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According to what I shall call ‘the essentialist de re theory’, although substance sortals 
do provide de dicto persistence conditions (such as (S)(1), (S)(2), (S)(3), and (P)(2)), they 
have, in addition to this, the feature that a thing that falls under a substance sortal has, 
essentially, the persistence conditions associated with that substance sortal. As a 
consequence (according to this theory) substance sortals have de re implications for the 
things that fall under them, and thus the persistence conditions that are associated with a 
substance sortal also have a de re modal aspect.
23
 The characterization of this extra de re 
modal aspect is complicated by the existence of the Abelardian version of the theory. 
However, according to the non-Abelardian version of the essentialist de re theory 
(according to which de re modal predication is referentially transparent), the essentialist 
de re modal aspect of the persistence conditions associated with substance sortals can be 
captured in de re general principles such as: 
 
(S)(2-Edr) For all x, if x is a statue, then, necessarily (if the matter that constitutes x at 
t is radically reshaped at t, x then ceases to exist). 
 
(S)(3-Edr) For all x, if x is a statue, then, necessarily (if a relatively small portion of 
the matter that constitutes x at t is removed and immediately replaced by exactly 
similar matter, and no other change is made to x, x survives). 
 
(P)(2-Edr) For all x, if x is a piece of clay, then necessarily (if the matter that 
constitutes x at t is radically reshaped at t but preserved in one coherent mass, x 
survives). 
 
                                                 
23
 The resulting de re essentialist theory will not necessarily say that all substance sortals are 
essential sortals. It may, for example, confine itself to the claim that what Wiggins calls ‘ultimate 
sortals’ are essential sortals, where an ultimate sortal is the most general sortal corresponding to a 
single principle of individuation (or set of persistence conditions). (cf. Wiggins 1980: 65, note 8.) 
See also note 2 above. 
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On the other hand, there is what I shall call ‘the pure de dicto theory’, which holds that 
the persistence conditions associated with a substance sortal are exhausted by de dicto 
principles such as (S)(1), (S)(2), (S)(3), (P)(2), and the like: principles that, by 
themselves, have no significant de re implications. 
  
 
8. Intermediate de re theories 
8.1 The potentiality theory 
It is evident, however, that the essentialist de re theory and the pure de dicto theory do 
not exhaust the options. One might be a de re theorist (a theorist who holds that 
substance sortals have significant de re modal implications) without thinking that these 
de re implications involve a commitment to essentialism, even essentialism of the 
‘Abelardian’ variety. There are at least two types of ‘intermediate de re theory’. The first, 
which I call (for want of a better term) ‘the potentiality theory’, holds that (to continue 
with the case of the statue and the clay) although the de re  
 
(3M) The statue could not have been subjected to a radical reshaping of its matter 
without being destroyed, 
 
and 
 
(4M) The piece of clay could not have been subjected to a radical reshaping of its 
matter and been destroyed, if the reshaping is one that preserves all its matter in one 
coherent mass 
 
are true, the ‘could not’ here should be interpreted as making a de re modal claim that is 
weaker than the claims involved in the essentialist interpretations (3M*) and (4M*) 
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considered in the previous sections.
24
 De re statements of the form ‘x could not have φ-d’ 
are notoriously capable of a variety of interpretations, many of which do not entail that 
there is no possible world in which x φ-s. (Consider, for example, the claims that I could 
not have completed last Saturday’s marathon successfully, or that I could not have got to 
Paris today in time for the conference.) So, for example, we might take (3M) as 
indicating a potentially weaker modal claim than the essentialist (3M*): perhaps that the 
statue lacks the capacity or potentiality to be radically reshaped without being destroyed, 
or (if this is different) that there is some restricted class of possible worlds such that, in 
none of the worlds in this restricted class is the statue radically reshaped without being 
destroyed. If some such non-essentialist interpretation of (3M) is acceptable, then, 
clearly, similar non-essentialist interpretations of (4M) are acceptable also. And if non-
essentialist interpretations of (3M) and (4M) are acceptable, then the choice is not 
between the ‘pure de dicto’ theory and the essentialist de re theory: there is at least one 
intermediate de re view, namely the ‘potentiality theory’. 
 
8.2 The counterfactual de re theory 
Even more obviously, however, there is an intermediate de re theory that rejects (3M) 
and (4M), but still endorses counterfactuals such as:  
 
(7M) If the statue had been subjected to a radical reshaping of its matter (including 
one in which all its matter was preserved in one coherent mass), then it would have 
been destroyed, 
 
                                                 
24
  Or their ‘Abelardian’ variants: for example the Abelardian version of (3M*), (3M*CP), 
according to which there is no possible world in which a statue-counterpart of the statue is 
subjected to a radical reshaping of its matter without being destroyed. See §6 above. For 
simplicity, I ignore the Abelardian variants in the current section. 
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and 
 
(8M) If the piece of clay had been subjected to a radical reshaping of its matter in 
which all its matter was preserved in one coherent mass, then it would have survived. 
 
The truth of (7M) may require that in the closest possible worlds in which the statue is 
subjected to a radical reshaping of its matter in which that matter is preserved in one 
coherent mass, it still has the persistence conditions of a statue. And the truth of (8M) 
may require that in the closest possible worlds in which the piece of clay is subjected to 
such a radical reshaping of its matter, the piece of clay still has the persistence conditions 
of a piece of clay. However, these implications obviously fall short of the implications of 
the essentialist interpretations of statements such as (3M) and (4M). (7M) and (8M) 
imply nothing about the properties (including the persistence conditions) that the statue 
and the piece of clay have in all possible worlds in which they exist (or even all possible 
worlds in which they are subjected to a certain kind of radical reshaping of their matter), 
and hence nothing about their essential properties. For obvious reasons, I shall call the 
intermediate de re theory that rejects statements like (3M) and (4M), but accepts 
counterfactuals like (7M) and (8M), ‘the counterfactual de re theory’.  
 
 
9. What is wrong with the pure de dicto theory? 
To recapitulate: according to the pure de dicto theory, the modal aspect of the persistence 
conditions associated with a substance sortal can be captured entirely in a set of de dicto 
principles of which the following are examples:  
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(S)(1) Necessarily (for all x, if x is a statue at any time in its existence, then x is a 
statue at all times in its existence). 
 
(S)(2) Necessarily (for all x, if x is a statue, then, if the matter that constitutes x at t is 
radically reshaped at t, x then ceases to exist). 
 
(P)(1) Necessarily (for all x, if x is a piece of clay at any time in its existence, then x is 
a piece of clay at all times in its existence). 
 
(P)(2) Necessarily (for all x, if x is a piece of clay, then, if the matter that constitutes x 
at t is radically reshaped at t but preserved in one coherent mass, x survives). 
 
Evidently, these four principles alone do not tell us everything about the persistence 
conditions for statues and pieces of clay.
25
 But is there any compelling reason to think 
that, in order to give an adequate account of the persistence conditions for statues and 
pieces of clay, we must supplement these principles with further principles that are de re, 
rather than de dicto? In other words, is there any compelling reason to reject the pure de 
dicto theory of persistence conditions in favour of some version of a de re theory – either 
‘essentialist’ or ‘intermediate’? 
 
9.1 The purity of the pure de dicto theory 
A preliminary issue is that one might think it impossible for the ‘pure’ de dicto theory to 
remain completely unsullied in its purity, for the following reason. The combination of 
the de dicto principles (S)(1) and (S)(2), for example, appears to imply, concerning any 
statue that actually exists at t: 
                                                 
25
 For example, these four principles alone tell us nothing positive about the passing-away 
conditions for pieces of clay, nothing about the preservation conditions for statues, and nothing 
about the ways in which a statue may go out of existence aside from radical reshaping. 
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(9M) The statue has, at t, no possible future in which it survives radical reshaping. 
 
(9M) does not imply either of the de re statements (3M) or (7M). Nevertheless, (9M) 
does appear to involve de re modal predication, and it appears to have some implications 
for the properties that the statue has in certain other possible worlds: namely, worlds that 
share their history, at time t, with the actual world.  
 Various things could be said in response to this issue. One might, for example, 
hold that, if the de re (9M) really is a consequence of the de dicto principles, this 
phenomenon should be assimilated to the fact that any de dicto modal statement may be 
regarded as having some, albeit trivial, de re modal implications: as, for example, the fact 
that it is a de dicto necessary truth that everything that is red is coloured entails that 
everything is essentially coloured-if-red – a genuine but trivial example of the de re.26  
 Rather than explore this issue, however, I shall simply bracket this consideration. 
Let ‘the pure de dicto theory’ henceforth denote a theory that recognizes only de dicto 
modal principles concerning persistence, plus any de re modal statements (perhaps 
including (9M)) that are consequences of the de dicto principles. There is still an 
important contrast between the pure de dicto theory, qualified in this way, and the 
intermediate and essentialist de re theories, since they recognize further de re principles 
that are not mere consequences of the de dicto principles. Hence there remains an 
important question whether there is any compelling reason to think that the pure de dicto 
theory fails to do justice to the modal significance of persistence conditions.  
 
                                                 
26
 cf. note 11 above. Of course, this point is subject to the proviso that the entailment will be 
rejected by one, such as Quine (1953), who accepts the de dicto but refuses to acknowledge the 
coherence of de re modality. 
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9.2 The explanation argument 
It might be thought that the pure de dicto theory is inadequate for the following reason. 
Consider a statue, Statue, and a piece of clay, Piece, which coincide from the very 
beginning of their existence until a later time at which their matter is radically reshaped 
but remains in one coherent mass. The principles (S)(2) and (P)(2), together with (S)(1) 
and (P)(1), entail that, when the radical reshaping occurs, Statue goes out of existence, 
whereas Piece survives. However, if we ask why, in this scenario, Statue goes out of 
existence while Piece survives, it may seem that the appeal to these de dicto principles is 
insufficient.
27
 Consider, once again, the necessarily permanent property being a 
permanent bachelor (§2 above). Although we have agreed that, unlike a substance sortal 
property, this property does not generate any passing away (or preservation) conditions, 
it evidently does generate the following de dicto principle: 
 
(B)(3) Necessarily (for all x, if x is a permanent bachelor, then there is no time t such 
that x marries at t). 
 
Yet it would be absurd to appeal to (B)(3) to explain why a particular man – Jim, say – 
who, as it turns out on his deathbead, was a permanent bachelor, did not marry when the 
opportunity presented itself. And it may seem that the obvious reason why this is absurd 
– why the ‘logical obstacle’ to matrimony involved in Jim’s being a permanent bachelor 
is irrelevant to the explanation of his failure to marry – is that, although Jim is in fact a 
permanent bachelor, he is only contingently a permanent bachelor. If he had married, he 
would not have been a permanent bachelor, but since he is only contingently a permanent 
bachelor, the fact that he was one, together with the truth of (B)(3), has no tendency to 
                                                 
27
 cf. Mackie 2007, discussing Stone 2005. 
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show that he could not have married; hence provides no explanation of why he did not 
marry when the opportunity presented itself. However, if this is the diagnosis of the 
absurdity, it may seem that, by parallel reasoning, it is also inappropriate to appeal to the 
de dicto principles (S)(2) and (S)(1) to explain why Statue goes out of existence when it 
is radically reshaped, unless we supplement the de dicto principles with the further de re 
modal claim that Statue is not merely contingently a statue, but essentially a statue, or 
that it could not have existed without being a statue.
28
 For if Statue is merely 
contingently a statue, the fact that it is a statue, together with the truth of (S)(2) and 
(S)(1), has no tendency to show that Statue could not have been radically reshaped 
without being destroyed. But if it has no tendency to show that, then it may seem that (by 
analogy with the case of the flawed attempt to explain Jim’s failure to marry), the fact 
that Statue is a statue, together with the truth of (S)(2) and (S)(1), cannot explain why 
Statue is destroyed when it is radically reshaped.  
 However, as Harold Noonan has shown, this superficially plausible ‘explanation 
argument’ (for the inadequacy of the de dicto explanation in the case of the statue) does 
not work.
29
 It ignores the fact that there is a crucial disanalogy between the explananda in 
the two cases. To attempt to appeal to the principle (B)(3) to explain why Jim does not 
marry when the opportunity presents itself is hopeless (and absurd) because it is an 
attempt to explain, by appeal to purely logical or conceptual considerations, a fact that 
requires a causal explanation, viz., that Jim does not marry. By contrast, the 
explanandum in the statue case – the fact that Statue goes out of existence when it is 
radically reshaped – is not something that calls for a causal explanation. Hence an 
                                                 
28
 cf. Mackie 2007: 29. The distinction between the essentialist and the ‘intermediate’ 
(‘potentiality theory’) readings of ‘could not’ discussed in §8.1 does not really matter to this 
argument, although it is the essentialist reading that seems most obviously relevant. 
 
29
 Noonan 2008: 93; elaborated in Noonan, forthcoming. The description in the text of Noonan’s 
counter-argument to the ‘explanation argument’ is, however, my own. 
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explanation of this explanandum in purely conceptual terms, by appeal to the de dicto 
principles (S)(2) and (S)(1), is entirely appropriate. Of course, a causal explanation is 
required for why the matter of Statue is radically reshaped. But in connection with the 
further question: ‘why did the radical reshaping of the matter of Statue put an end to 
Statue’s existence?’, the demand for a causal explanation is misguided. No causal 
explanation of the fact that the radical reshaping means the demise of Statue is either 
required or even appropriate. An entirely satisfactory explanation of why the radical 
reshaping of Statue’s matter, when it occurs, puts an end to Statue’s existence, is 
provided by the fact that Statue is a statue, together with the de dicto principles (S)(1) 
and (S)(2).
30 
 
9.3 The vacuous satisfaction argument  
There is, however, a second argument against the pure de dicto theory that is not so 
easily dismissed. I call it ‘the vacuous satisfaction argument’.  
  Suppose, as the pure de dicto theory maintains, that all that there is to a thing’s 
having the persistence conditions of a statue is its satisfying de dicto principles such as 
                                                 
30
 Noonan (2008 and forthcoming) uses this response to what I have called ‘the explanation 
argument’ to defend the contingent identity theory (or what he terms ‘Moderate Monism’) 
against the objection that it cannot give an adequate explanation, in modal terms, of why a statue 
goes out of existence when it is radically reshaped although the piece of clay with which it 
temporarily coincides does not. However, Noonan’s response does not require the adoption of 
the contingent identity theory. It can (and, if it is cogent, as I think it is, should) also be endorsed 
by a pluralist about coincidence cases (that is, by one who rejects the contingent identity theory, 
and believes that even a permanently coincident statue and piece of clay are distinct entities). In 
the presentation of his response in his (2008), Noonan characterizes it as turning on the fact that 
‘any situation one describes in which there is a permanent bachelor is one in which the man in 
question is identifiable in some other way’, whereas no such relevant alternative identification of 
the statue in the coincidence case is possible (2008: 93). This is, however, a slip. Clearly Statue 
can be identified in a way that does not entail that it has the persistence conditions of a statue – 
e.g., as ‘the artefact that I bought last week’ – just as Jim can be identified in a way that does not 
entail that he is a permanent bachelor. The crucial point (explained in the text above, and clarified 
in Noonan forthcoming) concerns the difference in the status of the explananda in the two cases 
as regards the relevance of the demand for a causal explanation. 
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(S)(1), (S)(2), and the like,
31
 and that all that there is to a thing’s having the persistence 
conditions of a piece of clay is its satisfying de dicto principles such as (P)(1) and (P)(2), 
and the like, as long as it does not do so vacuously simply by failing to satisfy the 
antecedent of the conditionals ‘if x is a statue . . .’ and ‘if x is a piece of clay . . .’. 32 It is 
clear that a single entity can, in principle, satisfy all four of the de dicto modal principles 
((S)(1), (S)(2), (P)(1), (P)(2)) in this way as long as it is never subjected to a radical 
transformation of its shape in which all  its matter is preserved in one coherent mass.  
 For suppose that there is a statue (Statue) that is never subjected to such a radical 
reshaping of its matter. Then, as well as satisfying (S)(1), Statue also satisfies (S)(2). 
However, there is a clear sense in which it satisfies (S)(2) vacuously. For although the 
antecedent of the first conditional in (S)(2) is fulfilled (since Statue is a statue), the 
antecedent of the second conditional in (S)(2) is not. But now, suppose, for the sake of 
argument, that Statue is not only a statue, but also a piece of clay. If so, then, according 
to (P)(1), Statue is a piece of clay throughout its existence. Although this may seem odd, 
there is nothing in (S)(1) and (P)(1), considered in themselves, to rule it out. However, 
the fact that (S)(2) and (P)(2) (in conjunction with (S)(1) and (P)(1)) provide potentially 
conflicting persistence conditions also poses no barrier to Statue’s being a piece of clay 
as well as a statue.
33
 For, since Statue satisfies (S)(2) vacuously, it also satisfies (P)(2) 
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 For simplicity, I shall say that an entity ‘satisfies’ a de dicto universally quantified principle 
such as (S)(1) just in case the entity satisfies the predicate that results from stripping the principle 
of both its modal operator and its universal quantifier. 
 
32
 This restriction is needed because we do not want to say that a table or a cat, for example, has 
the persistence conditions of a statue just because, by not being a statue, it vacuously satisfies 
principles such as (S)(1) and (S)(2). Obviously, (S)(1) and (S)(2) are vacuously satisfied in this 
way by anything that is not a statue, and (P)(1) and (P)(2) are vacuously satisfied in this way by 
anything that is not a piece of clay. (On the relevant notion of ‘satisfaction’, see the previous 
note.) 
 
33
 By saying that two sets of persistence conditions C1 and C2 are ‘potentially conflicting’ I mean 
that there are possible circumstances in which the demands of C1 and C2 are incompatible (as is 
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vacuously, for the very same reason. On the assumption that Statue is a piece of clay, it is 
a piece of clay that is never subjected to a radical reshaping of its matter. And, if so, it is 
a piece of clay that provides no counterexample to (P)(2). 
 But there is something puzzling about this result, even for someone who denies, 
or is agnostic about, the claim that statues are essentially statues, and pieces of clay 
essentially pieces of clay. The worry is that the constraints imposed by the de dicto 
persistence conditions alone make it too easy for something to be both a statue and a 
piece of clay. And the reason for this appears to be that the de dicto principles put no 
constraints at all on the ways in which things that are statues and pieces of clay would 
have behaved in certain counterfactual circumstances. For example, the satisfaction of 
the de dicto (S)(2) by a statue implies nothing about what would have become of it – that 
statue – if its matter had been radically reshaped. The most that we can say, on the basis 
of (S)(2), is that, if it had still been a statue, then, if its matter had been radically 
reshaped, it would not have survived the reshaping. But it seems counterintuitive to 
suppose that something’s being a statue (and hence having the persistence conditions of a 
statue) implies nothing about how it would have behaved – what would have happened to 
it – in counterfactual circumstances. We can say the same, mutatis mutandis, about 
pieces of clay: intuitively, something’s being a piece of clay (and hence having the 
persistence conditions of a piece of clay) has implications for what would have happened 
to that thing in counterfactual circumstances.  
 Consider the following analogy. Suppose that we were to attempt to define the 
properties of bravery and cowardice in terms of the following de dicto principles: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the case, for example, if in those circumstances the possession of C1 requires perishing, while the 
possession of C2 requires survival).  
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(Brave)  Necessarily (for all persons x, x is brave if and only if, if x is confronted  
with danger, x stands firm); 
 
(Coward)  Necessarily (for all persons x, x is a coward if and only if, if x is  
confronted with danger, x runs away). 
 
The description of the behaviour associated with bravery and cowardice in these 
definitions is, of course, absurdly simplistic. However, even if we ignore this deficiency, 
these definitions are obviously unsatisfactory, for the following reason. Evidently, the 
definitions (Brave) and (Coward) make it far too easy to be both brave and a coward: all 
that it takes is to have the good fortune never to be confronted with danger. But this fact 
clearly shows that these de dicto definitions are inadequate. To be brave seems to require 
(to put it crudely) that one have the disposition to stand firm in situations of danger; to be 
a coward seems to require that one have the disposition to run away in such situations.
34
 
And the possession of these dispositions is not guaranteed by the merely vacuous 
satisfaction of principles such as (Brave) and (Coward).
35
 
 It seems intuitively plausible, then, that the sortal properties of being a statue and 
being a piece of clay are, in some respects, similar to the (dispositional) properties of 
being brave and being a coward. For they have implications for the ways that things that 
are in fact statues and pieces of clay would have behaved (what would have been true of 
them) in some non-actual circumstances. However, as the examples of bravery and 
cowardice show, this fact has no tendency to suggest that the sortal properties are 
essential properties of the things that have them. Although to say that I am a coward may 
                                                 
34
 Of course, for reasons already indicated, this is far too simplistic an account of the behavioural 
dispositions that are involved in being brave and being a coward. But this does not matter for my 
purposes. 
 
35
 On what it means for an individual to ‘satisfy’ a principle such as (Brave) or (Coward), see 
note 31 above. 
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be to imply something about how I would have behaved in certain circumstances: for 
example (to continue with our simplistic account of the relevant behaviour), that I would 
have run away in a situation of danger, it is not to claim that in all possible circumstances 
in which I am in danger I run away. In particular, it allows for the fact that even if I am a 
coward, I may not be essentially a coward; if so, then my actually being a coward is 
consistent with there being some possible circumstances in which I am brave, and hence 
in which I stand firm in the face of danger. So the ‘vacuous satisfaction argument’, by 
itself, lends no support to the essentialist de re theory of persistence conditions rather 
than one of the intermediate de re theories (§8 above). Moreover, the theory to which the 
argument most obviously lends support is the ‘counterfactual’ version of the de re theory, 
rather than any stronger version.
36
 
 
9.4 Contingent identity, de re modality, and the vacuous satisfaction argument 
The vacuous satisfaction argument provides support for the conclusion that the pure de 
dicto theory is inadequate, and that the de dicto persistence conditions associated with 
substance sortals must be supplemented with further de re counterfactual persistence 
conditions; for example: 
 
(S)(2-Cdr) For all x, if x is a statue, then, if at any time in x’s existence the matter that 
then constituted x had (then) been radically reshaped, x would have ceased to exist. 
 
                                                 
36
 This is not to deny that there may be arguments for sortal essentialism that are independent of 
the question whether an adequate account of the persistence conditions provided by sortal 
concepts requires that things have their persistence conditions essentially. The evaluation of such 
additional arguments for sortal essentialism is beyond the scope of this paper, however. cf. §1 
above. 
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(P)(2-Cdr) For all x, if x is a piece of clay, then if at any time in x’s existence the 
matter that then constituted x had (then) been radically reshaped but preserved in one 
coherent mass, x would have survived.
37
 
 
These principles support de re counterfactuals, concerning a particular statue and a 
particular piece of clay, such as those discussed in §8.2 above: 
 
(7M) If the statue had been subjected to a radical reshaping of its matter (including 
one in which all its matter was preserved in one coherent mass), then it would have 
been destroyed. 
 
(8M) If the piece of clay had been subjected to a radical reshaping of its matter in 
which all its matter was preserved in one coherent mass, then it would have survived. 
 
In addition, though, these general de re counterfactual principles also entail that no single 
entity can be both a statue and a piece of clay, even if its matter is never in fact subjected 
to such a radical reshaping.  
 But now, as the reader will have anticipated, there is a complication. The vacuous 
satisfaction argument begins with the observation that the de dicto principles can be 
satisfied vacuously, and the thought that this is problematic. The conclusion of the 
argument is that, as a remedy, we should add, to the de dicto principles, de re 
counterfactual principles (such as (S)(2-Cdr) and (P)(2-Cdr)) that not only support 
particular de re statements such as (7M) and (8M), but also entail that a single entity 
cannot satisfy two potentially conflicting sets of de dicto persistence conditions, such as 
                                                 
37
 These formulations (of general de re counterfactual principles) are intended to serve as (non-
Abelardian) generalizations of counterfactuals such as (7M) and (8M). They may not perfectly 
succeed in fulfilling this aim, because of potential ambiguities in the interpretation of the 
temporal indicators in the general principles. However, I shall assume that these formulations 
will do for my purposes in this paper. 
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the ‘statue-set’ including (S)(2) and the ‘piece-of-clay-set’ including (P)(2).38 The 
addition of the general de re principles has the effect of transforming the merely potential 
conflict between the sets of de dicto persistence conditions into an actual conflict of 
modal (counterfactual) properties. It follows from this that the vacuous satisfaction 
argument provides a reason for rejecting the pure de dicto theory only for someone who 
is a ‘pluralist’ about coincident entities – and holds, for example, that it is impossible for 
a single entity to be both a statue and a piece of clay (given that the de dicto persistence 
conditions for statues and pieces of clay are potentially in conflict).
39
  
 Yet, as we know, there are theorists – the contingent identity theorists mentioned 
in §4 above, including Gibbard, Lewis, and Noonan – who hold that although temporary 
coincidence is not identity, permanent coincidence is identity. These theorists, far from 
repudiating the idea that a single entity can satisfy the de dicto persistence conditions for 
both statue and piece of clay through the accident of never having its matter radically 
reshaped, explicitly affirm this as part of their theory. Hence the vacuous satisfaction 
argument cannot provide the contingent identity theorist with a reason for rejecting the 
pure de dicto theory.  
 Nevertheless, as we have seen, the contingent identity theorist does typically 
reject the pure de dicto theory (§4 above). Although the contingent identity theorist 
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 Although the potential for conflict may appear to be generated by (S)(2) and (P)(2) alone, 
strictly speaking it requires the ‘necessary permanence’ principles (S)(1) and (P)(1) as well, for 
reasons noted in Mackie 2007. Without (S)(1), (S)(2) appears to be compatible with the following 
situation: a is a statue at t1; at t2 a ceases to be a statue, but continues to exist as something other 
than a statue; at a later time t3 a’s matter is radically reshaped, but a survives the reshaping 
because at t3 a is no longer a statue, and (S)(2) is a principle about statues.  
 
39
 Suppose that one’s reason for being a pluralist is that one thinks that potentially conflicting de 
dicto persistence conditions generate conflicting (de re) modal properties. Such a pluralist cannot, 
without circularity, defend the vacuous satisfaction argument on the grounds that it is congenial 
to pluralism. However, this does not matter for my purposes. All that I need, for the purposes of 
my argument here, is that the vacuous satisfaction argument rests on an intuition that the pluralist 
can respect, but the contingent identity theorist cannot. 
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cannot accept the general principles (S)(2-Cdr) and (P)(2-Cdr) – since these principles 
require a (non-Abelardian) treatment of modal predication as referentially transparent – 
the contingent identity theorist typically accepts de re counterfactuals such as (7M) and 
(8M), while giving them an (Abelardian) interpretation that prevents them from 
generating a conflict of modal properties. For example, according to the Abelardian 
version of counterpart theory discussed in §6 above, (7M) and (8M) may be interpreted 
as: 
 
(7MCP) The statue is such that, in the closest possible worlds in which its statue-
counterparts are subjected to a radical reshaping of their matter (including reshapings 
in which all the matter is preserved in one coherent mass), those statue-counterparts 
are destroyed, 
 
and 
 
(8MCP) The piece of clay is such that, in the closest possible worlds in which its piece-
of-clay-counterparts are subjected to a radical reshaping in which all their matter is 
preserved in one coherent mass, those piece-of-clay-counterparts survive. 
 
Evidently, (7MCP) and (8MCP) are consistent with its being the case that a statue that is 
not in fact subjected to such a radical reshaping is identical with a piece of clay with 
which it coincides throughout its existence, even though, had such a radical reshaping 
occurred, the coincidence would have been merely temporary rather than permanent, and 
the statue and the piece of clay would not have been identical.
 40
   
                                                 
40
 According to the contingent identity theorist (or ‘moderate monist’, to use the terminology 
employed by Noonan (2008 and forthcoming)), although the modal predicate ‘would have been 
destroyed if it had been radically reshaped’ is Abelardian, the predicate ‘will be destroyed if 
radically reshaped’ is not. This reflects the contingent identity theorist’s view that it is only 
permanent coincidence, and not temporary coincidence, that is identity. A theory that regards 
                                              
 
33
 This gives rise to the following challenge. A contingent identity theorist who 
adopts an Abelardian theory of de re modality may claim that the rationale for 
introducing de re persistence conditions in addition to de dicto persistence conditions is 
that substance sortals really do have counterfactual implications that are not captured by 
de dicto principles alone. The theorist can apparently pay lip service to the idea that 
reliance on de dicto principles alone makes it ‘too easy’ for something to be (for 
example) both a statue and a piece of clay: according to this contingent identity theorist, 
there really are further de re persistence conditions (albeit of a ‘devious’ kind) that must 
be satisfied, as illustrated by by (7MCP) and (8MCP).
41
 But what is unclear is what reason 
this Abelardian contingent identity theorist has for accepting the need for these additional 
de re conditions, given that the theorist must deny that it is either part of the point of, or 
an implication of, these extra de re persistence conditions that they rule out the 
satisfaction, by a single entity, of potentially conflicting de dicto persistence conditions. 
The contingent identity theorist therefore faces a challenge that the pluralist does not, 
concerning the theorist’s justification for rejecting the pure de dicto theory and for 
holding that the persistence conditions associated with sortal concepts involve an 
additional de re element. 
  Reflecting on the legacy of Quine’s scepticism about de re modality, John Divers 
has pressed, on behalf of the Quinean (or other) de re modal sceptic, the question what 
the point of de re modality is, and ‘why we should struggle to accommodate de re 
modalizing in our total theory’ (2007: 57). The attempt at the accommodation of the de 
                                                                                                                                                 
even temporary coincidence as identity (i.e., a version of ‘extreme monism’, according to the 
terminology of Fine 2003, followed by Noonan 2008 and forthcoming) must treat the non-modal 
predicate ‘will be destroyed if radically reshaped’ as Abelardian as well – as, for example, do the 
versions of stage theory advocated in Sider 2001 and Hawley 2001. Further discussion of 
extreme monism is beyond the scope of this paper, however. 
 
41
 I take the characterization ‘devious’ from one of the proponents of the contingent identity 
theory: Gibbard (1975, §VIII). 
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re that is most prominent in Divers’s paper is, however, that of David Lewis, with its 
employment of an ‘inconstant’ (‘Abelardian’) version of counterpart theory. The 
discussion in my paper suggests that, at least with regard to modal questions concerning 
persistence, the Lewisian may be particularly ill-placed to answer Divers’s challenge. For 
my arguments suggest that the Lewisian accommodation may be achieved only at the 
cost of sacrificing what rationale there is for regarding merely de dicto persistence 
conditions as inadequate. 
 
9.5 Two objections 
Before concluding, I consider two objections to the argument of the last section. It may 
be agreed that the contingent identity theorist cannot accept the vacuous satisfaction 
argument as a reason for supposing that persistence conditions have a de re aspect not 
captured by the pure de dicto theory, since the intuition behind the vacuous satisfaction 
argument is one that is at odds with the contingent identity theory. However, it may be 
objected that this fact does not have the significance that I attribute to it. Two different 
reasons might be proposed for this. 
 First, there is the possibility that my discussion has overlooked some further 
reason for supposing that a pure de dicto theory of persistence conditions is inadequate – 
a reason that the contingent identity theory may be as well equipped to accommodate as 
is the pluralist theory. In response to this, all that I can do is to ask to be shown what this 
further reason is. 
Secondly, it might be asked: why can’t the contingent identity theorists simply 
take it, as given, that the persistence conditions associated with sortal concepts do have 
de re implications (for example, counterfactual implications) that go beyond their de 
dicto implications, and regard their task as that of accommodating these de re 
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implications in their theory, rather than being required to show that a pure de dicto theory 
that fails to accommodate these de re implications is inadequate?  
My response to this second objection is implicit in the argument at the end of the 
previous section. Contingent identity theorists have a choice. They may either provide a 
theory of persistence conditions that is designed to accommodate the de re implications, 
or adopt the more revisionary strategy of rejecting a de re theory of persistence 
conditions in favour of a purely de dicto theory. If they adopt the first strategy, they face 
the question whether their accommodation does justice to the intuitions that lie behind 
the de re implications. When confronted with the contingent identity theorists’ 
Abelardian attempt to accommodate the apparent de re implications of sortal concepts, I 
think that many people’s initial reaction is to suspect that the contingent identity theorist 
has merely paid lip-service to the phenomena, without doing justice to the intuitions that 
lie behind them: in effect, that an Aberlardian account of de re modality does not take de 
re modality seriously. If I am right, then this suspicion, at least in the case of the apparent 
de re modal consequences of sortal concepts and their persistence conditions, is justified. 
 
 
10. Concluding remarks 
This paper does not, of course, attempt to give the final verdict on the modal significance 
of the persistence conditions that are associated with sortal concepts. I have, however, 
tried to do the following things. The first is to demonstrate the extent to which the modal 
significance of persistence conditions can be characterized without appeal to de re 
modality, and that there is therefore a serious question why, if at all, a purely de dicto 
theory of persistence conditions should be regarded as deficient (§§2–4). The second is to 
make salient the fact that, even if one rejects the pure de dicto theory, one may hold that 
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persistence conditions have significant de re implications without supposing that things 
have their persistence conditions essentially (and hence without embracing sortal 
essentialism), most notably by adopting an account of persistence conditions that limits 
their significant de re modal implications to counterfactual implications (§8). The third is 
to argue that, although a superficially plausible argument against the pure de dicto theory 
– the ‘explanation argument’ – is unsound, there is a persuasive argument – the ‘vacuous 
satisfaction argument’ – that does lend support to the rejection of a pure de dicto theory 
(§§9.2–9.3). The fourth is to point out that the support that this vacuous satisfaction 
argument provides for a de re theory of persistence conditions has two striking features. 
One is that the vacuous satisfaction argument provides no grounds for adopting an 
essentialist de re theory of persistence conditions, as opposed to a counterfactual de re 
theory (§9.3). The other is that the grounds that the vacuous satisfaction argument 
provides for the rejection of the pure de dicto theory of persistence conditions appear to 
be available only to one who is a pluralist about cases of permanent coincidence (§§9.4). 
Thus they appear to provide no reason why a contingent identity theorist should regard 
the pure de dicto theory as inadequate. As a consequence, there is a challenge, to these 
theorists, concerning their justification for claiming, as they typically do, that the 
persistence conditions associated with sortal concepts have implications that are de re as 
well as de dicto.
42
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